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AN APPROACH TO RAID-6 BASED ON CYCLIC GROUPS
ROBERT JACKSON, DMITRIY RUMYNIN, AND OLEG V. ZABORONSKI
Abstract. As the size of data storing arrays of disks grows, it becomes vital to protect data against
double disk failures. A popular method of protection is via the Reed-Solomon (RS) code with two parity
words. In the present paper we construct alternative examples of linear block codes protecting against two
erasures. Our construction is based on an abstract notion of cone. Concrete cones are constructed via matrix
representations of cyclic groups of prime order. In particular, this construction produces EVENODD code.
Interesting conditions on the prime number arise in our analysis of these codes. At the end, we analyse an
assembly implementation of the corresponding system on a general purpose processor and compare its write
and recovery speed with the standard DP-RAID system.
1. Introduction
A typical storage solution targeting a small-to-medium size enterprise is a networked unit with 12 disk
drives with total capacity of around 20 TB [13, 9]. The volume of information accumulated and stored by a
typical small-size information technology company amounts to fifty 100-gigabyte drives. The specified mean
time between failures (MTBF) for a modern desktop drive is about 500,000 hours [14]. Assuming that such
an MTBF is actually achieved and that the drives fail independently, the probability of a disk failure in the
course of a year is 1− e−12/57 ≈ 0.2. Therefore, even a small company can no longer avoid the necessity of
protecting its data against disk failures. The use of redundant arrays of independent disks (RAIDs) enables
such a protection in a cost efficient manner.
To protect an array of N disks against a single disk failure it is sufficient to add one more disk to the
array. For every N bits of user data written on N disks of the array, a parity bit equal to an exclusive OR
(XOR) of these bits is written on the (N +1)-st disk. Binary content of any disk can be then recovered as a
bitwise XOR of contents of remaining N disks. The corresponding system for storing data and distributing
parity between disks of the array is referred to as RAID-5 [8]. Today, RAID-5 constitutes the most popular
solution for protected storage.
As the amount of data stored by humanity on magnetic media grows, the danger of multiple disk failures
within a single array becomes real. Maddock, Hart and Kean argue that for a storage system consisting
of one hundred 8 + P RAID-5 arrays the rate of failures amounts to losing one array every six months [8].
Because of this danger, RAID-5 is currently being replaced with RAID-6, which offers protection against
double failure of drives within the array. RAID-6 refers to any technique where two strips of redundant data
are added to the strips of user data, in such a way that all the information can be restored if any two strips
are lost.
A number of RAID-6 techniques are known [4, 8, 10].A well-known RAID-6 scheme is based on the
rate-255/257 Reed-Solomon code [1]. In this scheme two extra disks are introduced for up to 255 disks of
data and two parity bytes are computed per 255 data bytes. Hardware implementation of RS-based RAID-
6 is as simple as operations in F˜ = GF (256), which are byte-based. Addition of bytes is just a bitwise
XOR. Multiplication of bytes corresponds to multiplication of boolean polynomials modulo an irreducible
polynomial. Multiplication can be implemented using XOR-gates, AND-gates and shifts.
Some RAID-6 schemes use only bitwise XOR for the computation of parity bits by exploiting a two-
dimensional striping of disks of the array. Examples are a proprietary RAID-DP developed by Network
Appliances [7] and EVENODD [2]. Some other RAID-6 methods use a non-trivial striping and employ only
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XOR operation for parity calculation and reconstruction. Examples include X-code, ZZS-code and Park-code
[8, 11, 12].
In all the cases mentioned above, the problem dealt with is inventing an error correcting block code capable
of correcting up to two erasures (we assume that it is always known which disks have failed). In the present
paper we describe a general approach to the solution of this problem, which allows one to develop an optimal
RAID-6 scheme for given technological constraints (e.g. available hardware, the number of disks in the array,
the required read and write performance). We also consider an assembly implementation of an exemplary
RAID-6 system built using our method and show that it outperforms the Linux kernel implementation of
RS-based RAID-6.
The paper is organised as follows. In Section 2 we discuss RAID-6 in the context of systematic linear
block codes and construct simple examples of codes capable of correcting two errors in known positions. In
Section 3 we identify an algebraic structure (cone) common to all such codes and use it to construct RAID-6
schemes starting with elements of a cyclic group of a prime order. Section 3.3 is of particular interest to
number theorists where we discuss a new condition on the prime numbers arising in the context of RAID-6
schemes. In Section 4 we compare encoding and decoding performances of an assembly implementation of
RAID-6 based on Z17 with its RS-based counterpart implemented as a part of Linux kernel.
Let us comment on the relation of the presented material to other modern research efforts. Section 2 is
rather standard [3]. All original theoretical material of this paper is in Section 3. The notion of a cone is
somewhat related to a non-singular difference set of Blaum and Roth [3] but there are essential differences
between them. The cone from a cyclic group of prime order as in Lemma 3.4.1 gives EVENODD code [2].
Its extended versions and connections to number theoretic conditions are new.
2. RAID-6 from the viewpoint of linear block codes.
Suppose that information to be written on the array of disks is broken into words of length n bits. What
is the best rate linear block code, which can protect data against the loss of two words?
Altogether, there are 22n possible pairs of words. In order to distinguish between them, one needs at least
2n distinct syndromes. Therefore, any linear block code capable of restoring 2 lost words in known locations
must have at least 2n parity checks. Suppose the size of the information block is Nn bits or N words. In
the context of RAID, N is the number of information disks to be protected against the failure. Then the
code’s block size must be at least (2 +N)n and the rate is
R ≤
N
N + 2
This result is intuitively clear: to protect N information disks against double failure, we need at least 2
parity disks. Note however, that in order to achieve this optimal rate, the word length n must grow with
the number of disks N . Really, the size of parity check matrix is 2n× (N + 2)n. All columns of the matrix
must be distinct and nonzero. Therefore, (N + 2)n ≤ (22n − 1), i. e.
1
n
(
22n − 1− 2n
)
≥ N
If in particular n = 1, then N ≤ 1. Therefore, if one wants to protect information written on the disks against
double failures using just two parity disks, the word size n ≥ 2 is necessary. If n = 2, we get N ≤ 5. In
reality, the lower bound on n (or, equivalently, the upper bound on N) is more severe, as the condition that
all columns of parity check matrix are distinct leads to a code with minimal distance dmin = 2. However, in
order to build a code which corrects up to 2n errors in the known location we need dmin = 2n.
In the following subsections we will construct explicit examples of linear codes for RAID-6 for small values
of n and N . These examples both guide and illustrate our general construction of RAID-6 codes presented
in Section 3.
2.1. Redundant array of four independent disks, which protects against the failure of any two
disks. We restrict our attention to systematic linear block codes. These are determined by the parity
matrix. To preserve a backward compatibility with RAID-5 schemes, we require half of the parity bits to be
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the straight XOR of the information bits. Hence the general form of the parity check matrix for N = 2 is
P =
(
In×n In×n In×n 0n×n
H G 0n×n In×n,
)
(1)
where In×n and 0n×n are n× n identity and zero matrix correspondingly; G and H are some n× n binary
matrices. The corresponding parity check equations are
(2) d1 + d2 + pi1 = 0 and H · d1 +G · d2 + pi2 = 0.
Here d1, d2 are n-bit words written on disks 1 and 2, pi1 and pi2 are n-bit parity check words written on
disks 3 and 4; ”·” stands for binary matrix multiplication.
Matrices G and H defining the code are constrained by the condition that the system of parity check
equations must have a unique solution with respect to any pair of variables. To determine these constraints
we need to consider the following particular cases.
(pi1, pi2) are lost. The system (2) always has a unique solution with respect to lost variables: we can compute
parity bits in terms of information bits.
(d1, pi2) are lost. The system (2) always has a unique solution with respect to lost variables: compute d1 in
terms of pi1 and d2 using the first equation of (2) as in RAID-5. Then compute pi2 using the second
equation.
(d2, pi2) are lost. The system (2) always has a unique solution with respect to lost variables: compute d2
using pi1 and d1 as in RAID-5. Then compute pi1 using (2).
(pi1, d1) are lost. The system (2) always has a unique solution with respect to lost variables provided the
matrix H is invertible.
(pi1, d2) are lost. The system (2) always has a unique solution with respect to lost variables provided the
matrix G is invertible.
(d1, d2) are lost. The system (2) always has a unique solution with respect to lost variables provided the
matrix
(
In×n In×n
Hn×n Gn×n
)
is invertible.
As it turns out, one can build a parity check matrix satisfying all the non-degeneracy requirements listed
above for n = 2. The simplest choice is
H = I2×2, G =
(
0 1
1 1
)
.(3)
Non-degeneracy of the three matrices H , G and (2.1) is evident. For instance1,
det
(
In×n In×n
Hn×n Gn×n
)
= −1 = 1.
We conclude that the linear block code with a 4 × 8 parity check matrix (1, 3) gives rise to RAID-6
consisting of four disks. The computation of parity dibits pi1, pi2 in the described DP RAID is almost as
simple as the computation of regular parity bits: Let d1 = (d11, d12) and d2 = (d21, d22) be the dibits to be
written on disks one and two correspondingly. Then
pi11 = d11 + d21, pi12 = d12 + d22,
pi21 = d11 + d22, pi22 = d12 + d21 + d22.(4)
The computations involved in the recovery of lost data are bitwise XOR only. As an illustration, let us write
down expressions for lost data bits in terms of parity bits explicitly:
d22 = pi11 + pi12 + pi21 + pi22, d12 = pi11 + pi21 + pi22,
d11 = pi11 + pi12 + pi22, d21 = pi12 + pi22.
It is interesting to note that RAID-6 code described here is equivalent to Network Appliances’ horizontal-
diagonal parity RAID-DPTM with two data disks [7]. Really, diagonal-horizontal parity system for two info
disks is
A B HP DP1
C D HP2 DP2,
1The reader is aware that −1 = 1 6= 0 in characteristic 2
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where strings (A,C) are written on information disk 1, strings (B,D) are written on disk 2, (HP,HP2) is
horizontal parity, (DP1, DP2) is diagonal parity. By definition, HP = A+B, HP2 = C+D, DP1 = A+D,
DP2 = B + C +D, which coincides with parity check equations (4).
On the other hand, the code (1) is a reduction of the RS code based on GF (4) which we will describe in
the next subsection.
2.2. Redundant array of five independent disks, which protects against the failure of any two
disks. The code (1) can be extended to a scheme providing double protection of user data written on three
disks [3, Example 1.1]. The parity check matrix is
P =
(
I2×2 I2×2 I2×2 I2×2 02×2
I2×2 G G
2 02×2 I2×2,
)
(5)
where 2× 2 matrix G was defined in the previous subsection. The corresponding parity check equations are
(6) d1 + d2 + d3 + pi1 = 0, d1 +G · d2 +G
2 · d3 + pi2 = 0.
The solubility of these equations with respect to any pair of variables from the set {d1, d2, d3, pi1, pi2}
requires two extra conditions of non-degeneracy in addition to non-degeneracy conditions listed in the pre-
vious subsection. Namely, matrices
(
I2×2 I2×2
I2×2 G
2
)
and
(
I2×2 I2×2
G G2
)
must be invertible. It is possible
to check the invertibility of these matrices via a direct computation. However, in the next section we will
construct a generalisation of the above example and find an elegant way of proving non-degeneracy.
The code (1) is a reduction of (5) corresponding to d3 = 0. Note also that the code (5) is equivalent to
rate-3/5 Reed-Solomon code based on GF (4): a direct check shows that the set of 2× 2 matrices 0, 1, G,G2
is closed under multiplication and addition and all non-zero matrices are invertible. Thus this set forms a
field isomorphic to GF (4). On the other hand, as we established in the previous subsection, the code (1)
is equivalent to RAID-DPTM with four disks. Therefore, RAID-DPTM with four disks is a particular case
of the RS-based RAID-6. It would be interesting to see if RAID-DPTM can be reduced to the RS-based
RAID-6 in general.
We are now ready to formulate general properties of linear block codes suitable for RAID-6 and construct
a new class of such codes.
3. RAID-6 based on the cyclic group of a prime order.
3.1. RAID-6 and cones of GLn(F). In this subsection we will define a general mathematical object
underlying all existing algebraic RAID-6 schemes. We recall that F = GF (2) is the field of two elements and
GLn(F) is the set of n× n invertible matrices.
Definition 3.1.1. A cone2 C is a subset of GLn(F) such that g + h ∈ GLn(F) for all g 6= h ∈ C.
This notion is related to non-singular difference sets of Blaum and Roth [3]. The cone satisfies the axioms
P1 and P2 of Blaum and Roth but the final axiom P3 or P3’ is too restrictive for our ends. On the other
hand, we consider only binary codes while Blaum and Roth consider codes over any finite field.
A standard example of a cone appears in the context of Galois fields. If we choose a basis of GF (2n) as
a vector space over F then we can think of GLn(F) as the group of all F-linear transformations of GF (2
n).
Multiplications by non-zero elements of GF (2n) form a cone. If α ∈ GF (2m) is a primitive generator and g
is the matrix of multiplication by α then this cone is {gm | 0 ≤ m ≤ 2n − 2}. This cone gives the RS-code
with two parity words.
The usefulness of cones for RAID-6 is explained by the following
Lemma 3.1.2. Let C = {g1, g2, . . . gN} ⊆ GLn(F) be a cone of N elements. Then the system of parity
equations
dN+1 =
N∑
k=1
dk and dN+2 =
N∑
k=1
gkdk(7)
2 This terminology is slightly questionable. If one asks g + h ∈ C then C ∪ {0} is a convex cone in the usual mathematical
sense. Our choice of the term is influenced by this analogy. Non-singular difference set or quasicone or RAID-cone could be
more appropriate scientifically but would pay a heavy linguistic toll.
4
has a unique solution with respect to any pair of variables (di, dj) ∈ F
n × Fn, 1 ≤ i < j ≤ N + 2. Here di
are binary n-dimensional vectors.
Proof. The fact that system (7) has a unique solution with respect to (dN+1, dN+2) is obvious.
The system has a unique solution with respect to (dN+1, dj) for any j ≤ N : from the second of equations
(7), dj = g
−1
j (dN+2 +
∑N
k 6=j gkdk), where we used invertibility of gj ∈ GLn(F). With dj known, dN+1 can
be computed from the first of equations (7).
The system has a unique solution with respect to (dN+2, dj) for any j ≤ N : from the first of equations
(7), dj = dN+1 +
∑N
k 6=j dk. With dj known, dN+2 can be computed from the second of equations (7).
The system has a unique solution with respect to any pair of variables di, dj for 1 ≤ i < j ≤ N :
multiplying the first of equations (7) with gi and adding the first and second equations, we get dj =
(gi + gj)
−1(gidN+1 + dN+2 +
∑N
k 6=i,j(gk + gi)dk). Here we used the invertibility of the sum gi + gj for any
i 6= j, which follows from the definition of the cone. With dj known, di can be determined from any of the
equations (7). QED
In the context of RAID-6, di for 1 ≤ i ≤ N can be thought of as n-bit strings of user data, dN+1, dN+2
- as n-bit parity strings. The lemma proved above ensures that any two strings can be restored from the
remaining N strings.
We conclude that any cone can be used to build RAID-6. The following lemma gives some necessary
conditions for a cone.
Lemma 3.1.3. Let C ⊂ GLn(F) be a cone.
(i) For all g, h ∈ C such that g 6= h and for all x ∈ GF (2m)n, gx = hx if and only if x = 0.
(ii) No two elements of the same cone can share an eigenvector in Fn.
(iii) The cone C can contain no more than one permutation matrix.
Proof. To prove (i), assume that there is x 6= 0 : gx = hx. Then (g+h)x = 0, which contradicts the fact
that g+ h is non-degenerate. Therefore, x = 0. Let us prove (ii) now. As elements of C are non-degenerate,
the only possible eigenvalue in F is 1, thus for any two elements sharing an eigenvector x, x = hx = gx,
which again would imply degeneracy of h+g unless x = 0. The statement (iii) follows from (ii) if one notices
that any two permutation matrices share an eigenvector whose components are all equal to one. QED
The notion of the cone is convenient for restating well understood conditions for a linear block code to be
capable of recovering up to two lost words. Our main challenge is to find examples of cones with sufficiently
many elements, which lead to easily implementable RAID-6 systems. We will now construct a class of cones
starting with elements of a cyclic subgroup of GLn(F) of a prime order.
3.2. RAID-6 based on matrix generators of ZN . We start with the following
Theorem 3.2.1. Let N be an odd number. Let g be an n × n binary matrix such that gN = Id and
Id + gm is non-degenerate for each proper3 divisor m of N . Then the elements of cyclic group ZN =
{Id, g, g2, . . . , gN−1} form a cone.
The proof of the Theorem 3.2.1 is based on the following two lemmas.
Lemma 3.2.2. Let g be a binary matrix such that Id+ g is non-degenerate and gN = Id, where N is an
integer. Then
N−1∑
k=0
gk = 0(8)
Proof. Let us multiply the left hand side of (8) with (Id+ g) and simplify the result using that h+h = 0
for any binary matrix:
(Id+ g)
N−1∑
k=0
gk = Id+ g + g + g2 + . . .+ gN−1 + gN−1 + gN = Id+ gN = Id+ Id = 0.
As Id+ g is non-degenerate, this implies that
∑N−1
k=0 g
k = 0. QED
Lemma 3.2.2 is a counterpart of a well-known fact from complex analysis that roots of unity add to zero.
3a natural number m < N that divides N
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Lemma 3.2.3. Let g be a binary matrix such that gN = Id for an odd number N and Id + gm is non-
degenerate for every proper divisor m of N . Then the matrix gl + gk is non-degenerate for any k, l : 0 ≤
k < l < N .
Proof. As gN = Id, the matrix g is invertible. To prove the lemma, it is therefore sufficient to check the
non-degeneracy of Id+ gk for 0 < k < N .
The group ZN = {1, g, g
2, . . . , gN−1} is cyclic. An element gk = g
k for 0 < k < N generates the cyclic
subgroup ZN/d where d is the the greatest common divisor of N and k and the element g
d generates the
same subgroup. Since the matrix gd satisfies all the conditions of Lemma 3.2.2, the sum of all elements of
ZN/d is zero. Therefore,
0 =
N
d
−1∑
m=0
gmk = (Id+ gk) + g
2
k(Id+ gk) + . . .+ g
N−3
k (Id+ gk) + g
N−1
k = 0.(9)
The grouping of terms used in (9) is possible as N/d is odd. Assume that matrix 1+ gk is degenerate. Then
there exists a non-zero binary vector x such that (1 + gk)x = 0. Applying both sides of (9) to x we get
gN−1k x = g
k(N−1)x = 0. This contradicts non-degeneracy of g. Thus the non-degeneracy of 1 + gk is proved
for all 0 < k < N . QED
The proof of Theorem 3.2.1. The matrix g described in the statement of the theorem satisfies all
requirements of Lemma 3.2.3. The statement of the theorem follows from Definition 3.1.1 of the cone. QED
Theorem 3.2.1 allows one to determine whether elements of ZN belong to the same cone by verifying a
single non-degeneracy conditions imposed on the generator.
The following corollary of Theorem 3.2.1 makes an explicit link between the constructed cone and RAID-6:
Corollary 3.2.4. Let g be an n× n binary matrix such that gN = Id for an odd number N and Id+ gm
is non-degenerate for every proper divisor m of N . The systematic linear block code defined by the parity
check matrix
P =
(
In×n In×n In×n . . . I I 0
In×n g g
2 . . . gN−1 0 In×n,
)
can recover up to 2 n-bit lost words in known positions. Equivalently, the system of the parity check equations
d1 + d2 + . . .+ dN + dN+1 = 0
d1 + gd2 + . . .+ g
N−1dN + dN+2 = 0(10)
has a unique solution with respect to any pair of variables (di, dj), 1 ≤ i < j ≤ N + 2.
Proof. It follows from Theorem 3.2.1. that the first N powers of g belong to a cone. The statement of
the corollary is an immediate consequence of Lemma 3.1.2 for gk = g
k−1, 1 ≤ k ≤ N . QED.
As a simple application of Theorem 3.2.1, let us show that the parity check matrix (5) does indeed satisfy
all non-degeneracy requirements. The matrix G =
(
0 1
1 1
)
is non degenerate and has order 3. Also, the
matrix Id + G =
(
1 1
1 0
)
is non-degenerate. Hence in virtue of Corollary 3.2.4, the parity check matrix
(5) determines a RAID system consisting of five disks, that protects against the failure of any two disks.
3.3. Extension of ZN -based cones for certain primes. We will now show that for certain primes, the
cone constructed in the previous subsection can be extended. The existence of such extensions give some
curious conditions on a prime number, one of which is new to the best of our knowledge. We start with the
following
Lemma 3.3.1. Let N > 2 be a prime number. Then the group ring R = FZN of the cyclic group of order
N is isomorphic to F ⊕ F̂k where F̂ = GF (2d), d is the smallest positive integer such that 2d = 1 mod N ,
k = (N − 1)/d.
Proof. By the Chinese Remainder Theorem, R ∼= ⊕kj=0F[X ]/(fj) where X
N − 1 = f0 · f1 · · · fk is the
decomposition into irreducible over F polynomials and f0 = X − 1. Let α be a root of fj for some j > 0.
Then d = deg fj is the smallest number such that α ∈ GF (2
d) ∼= F[X ]/(fj). Hence, α
2d−1 = 1 and d is the
smallest with such property. As N is prime, α is a primitive N -th root of unity. Hence, N divides 2d − 1
and d is the smallest with such property.
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It follows that for j > 0 all fj have degree d and all F[X ]/(fj) are isomorphic to GF (2
d). QED.
One case of particular interest is k = 1 which happens when 2 is a primitive N−1-th root of unity modulo
N . This forces k = 1 and d = N − 1. Such primes in the first hundred are 3, 5, 11, 13, 19, 29, 37, 53, 59, 61,
67, 83 [15]. If a generalised Riemann’s hypothesis holds true then there are infinitely many such primes [5].
Lemma 3.3.2. Let N > 2 be a prime number such that 2 is a primitive N − 1-th root of unity modulo N .
Let g be an n× n binary matrix such that Id+ g is non-degenerate and gN = Id. Then the set of 2N−1 − 1
matrices S = {ga1 + ga2 + . . .+ gat | 0 ≤ a1 < a2 . . . < at < N, 1 ≤ t ≤
N−1
2 is a cone.}
Proof. Matrix g defines a ring homomorphism φ : R→Mn(F), φ(
∑
k αkX
k) =
∑
k αkg
k from the group
ring to a matrix ring. Since 1 + g is invertible,
1 + g + g2 + . . .+ gN−1 = (1 + gN)(1 + g)−1 = 0
and 1 +X + . . .+XN−1 lies in the kernel of φ. Since R/(1 +X + . . .+XN−1) ∼= F[X ]/(f1) ∼= F̂, the image
φ(R) is a field and S is a subset of φ(R). Finally, as f1 = 1+X + . . .+X
N−1 is the minimal polynomial of
g, all elements ga1 + ga2 + . . .+ gat listed above are distinct and nonzero and S = φ(R) \ {0}. QED.
Notice that for N = 3, the set S consists only of Id and g.
The cone S in Lemma 3.3.2. may be difficult to use in a real system but it contains a very convenient
subcone as soon as N > 3. This subcone consists of elements gi and Id + gj . The following theorem gives
a condition on the prime p for these elements to form a cone. This condition is new to the best of our
knowledge.
Theorem 3.3.3. The following conditions are equivalent for a prime number N > 2.
(1) For any n × n binary matrix g such that Id + g is non-degenerate and gN = Id the set of 2N − 1
matrices S = {Id, g, g2, . . . , gN−1, Id+ g, Id+ g2, . . . , Id+ gN−1} is a cone.
(2) For no primitive N -th root of unity α in the algebraic closure of F, the element α+ 1 is an N -th root
of unity.
(3) For any 0 < m < N the polynomials XN + 1 and Xm +X + 1 are relatively prime.
(4) No primitive N -th root of unity α in the algebraic closure of F satisfies αm+αl+1 = 0 with N > m >
l > 0.
Proof. First, we observe that (1) is equivalent to (4). If (4) fails, there exists an N -th root of unity α
such that αm + αl + 1 = 0. Let f(X) be the minimal polynomial of α. The matrix g of multiplication by
the coset of X in F[X ]/(f) fails condition (1) with gm + gl + 1 = 0.
If (4) holds and g is a matrix as in (1) then the elements of S are all invertible matrices by Theorem 3.2.1.
Moreover, it only remains to establish that each matrix gm + gl + Id, N > m > l > 0 is invertible. Suppose
that it is not invertible. It must have an eigenvector v ∈ Fn with the zero eigenvalue. It follows that fv(X),
the minimal polynomial of g with respect to v, divides both XN + 1 and Xm + X l + 1. Since 1 is not a
root of Xm +X l +1, any root α of fv(X) in the algebraic closure of F is a primitive N -th root of unity and
satisfies αm + αl + 1 = 0.
Equivalence of (4) and (3) is clear: β = αl is also a primitive root, hence condition (4) can be rewritten
as no root β satisfies βs + β + 1 = 0 with N > s > 0. Thus, XN + 1 and Xm +X + 1 do not have common
roots in the algebraic closure of F and must be relatively prime.
Equivalence of (3) and (2) comes from rewriting αm + α+1 = 0 as αm = α+ 1 and observing that αm is
necessarily a primitive N -th root of unity. QED.
This theorem allows us to sort out whether any particular prime N is suitable for extending the cone.
Corollary 3.3.4. A Fermat prime N > 3 satisfies the conditions of Theorem 3.3.3. A Mersenne prime
fails the conditions of Theorem 3.3.3.
Proof. A Fermat prime is of the form N = 2k + 1. Hence, for a primitive Nth root of unity α
(α+ 1)N = (α+ 1)2
k
(α + 1) = (α2
k
+ 1)(α+ 1) = α−1 + α.
If this is equal 1, then α2 + α+ 1 = 0, forcing N = 3. A Mersenne prime is of the form N = 2k − 1. Hence,
(α+ 1)N = (α+ 1)2
k
(α+ 1)−1 = (α2
k
+ 1)(α+ 1)−1 = (α + 1)(α+ 1)−1 = 1.
QED.
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In fact, most of the primes appear to satisfy the conditions of Theorem 3.3.3. In the first 500 primes, the
only primes that fail are Mersenne and 73. Samir Siksek has found several more primes that fail but are not
Mersenne. These are (in the bracket we state the order of 2 in the multiplicative group of GF (p)) 73 (9)
178481 (23), 262657 (27), 599479 (33), 616318177 (37), 121369 (39), 164511353 (41), 4432676798593 (49),
3203431780337 (59), 145295143558111 (65), 761838257287 (67), 10052678938039 (69), 9361973132609 (73),
581283643249112959 (77). It would be interesting to know whether there are infinitely many primes failing
the conditions of Theorem 3.3.3.
Utilising the cone in Theorem 3.3.3., we start with a matrix generator of the cyclic group of an appropriate
prime order N to build a RAID-6 system protecting up to 2N − 1 information disks. The explicit expression
for Q-parity is
Q =
N−1∑
k=0
gkdk +
2N−2∑
k=N
(Id+ gk−N+1)dk,(11)
where d0, d1, . . . , d2N−2 are information words.
3.4. Specific examples of matrix generators of ZN and the corresponding RAID-6 systems. Now
we are ready to construct explicit examples of RAID-6 based on the theory of cones developed in the above
subsections. The non-extended code, based on the Sylvester matrix, is known as EVENODD code [2].
Lemma 3.4.1. Let SN be the (N − 1)× (N − 1) Sylvester matrix,
SN =


0 0 0 · · · 1
1 0 0 0 · · 1
0 1 0 0 0 · 1
· · · · · · ·
0 0 0 · 1 0 1
0 0 0 · · 1 1


.
Then
(i) SN has order N .
(ii) Matrix Id+ SN is non-degenerate if N is odd and is degenerate if N is even.
Proof. (i) An explicit computation shows, that for any (N − 1)-dimensional binary vector x and for any
1 ≤ k ≤ N ,
SkN


xN−1
xN−2
xN−3
·
·
·
·
x1


=


xk
xk
xk
·
·
·
·
xk


+


xk−1
xk−2
·
x1
0
xN−1
·
xk+1


.(12)
In the above formula xj ≡ 0, unless 1 ≤ j ≤ (N − 1). Therefore, S
k
N 6= Id, for any 1 ≤ k ≤ N − 1. Setting
k = N in the above formula, we get SNN x = x for any x, which implies that S
N
N = Id. Therefore, the order
of the matrix SN is N .
(ii) The characteristic polynomial of SN is f(x) =
∑N−1
k=0 x
k. (In order to prove this it is sufficient to
notice that the matrix SN is the companion matrix of the polynomial f(x) [6]. As such, f(x) is both the
characteristic and the minimal polynomial of the matrix SN .) Therefore,
f(SN ) =
N−1∑
k=0
SkN = 0.
Notice that the matrix SN is non-degenerate as it has a positive order. If N is odd, we can re-write the
characteristic polynomial as
f(SN ) = (Id+ SN )(1 + SN + S
3
N + . . .+ S
(N−3)
N ) + S
N−1
N
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Therefore, the degeneracy of Id+ SN will contradict the non-degeneracy of SN . If N is even, the sum of all
rows of Id+ SN is zero, which implies degeneracy. QED
Lemma 3.4.1 states that the matrix SN generates the cyclic group ZN and that the matrix Id + SN is
non-degenerate for any odd N . Given that N is an odd prime, Corollary 3.2.4 implies that using parity
equations (10) with g = SN , it is possible to protect N data disks against the failure of any two disks.
Furthermore, if N > 3 is a Fermat prime or 2 is a primitive root modulo N , 2N − 1 data disks can be
protected against double failure thanks to the results of section 3.1.
We will refer to the RAID-6 system based on Sylvester matrix SN as ZN -RAID. Let us give several
examples of such systems.
(1) Z3-RAID has been considered in subsections 2.1, 2.2. It can protect up to 3 information disks
against double failure. As N = 3, protection of 5 information disks using extended Q-parity (11) is
impossible.
(2) Using Z17-RAID, one can protect up to N = 17 disks using Q-parity (10) and up to 2N − 1 = 33
disks using extended Q-parity (11).
(3) Using Z257-RAID, one can protect up to N = 257 disks using Q-parity (10) and up to 2N−1 = 513
disks using extended Q-parity (11).
It can be seen from (12), that the multiplication of data vectors with any power of the Sylvester matrix
SN requires one left and one right shift, one n-bit XOR and one AND only. Thus the operations of updating
Q-parity and recovering data within ZN -RAID does not require any special instructions, such as Galois
field look-up tables for logarithms and products. As a result, the implementation of ZN -RAID can in some
cases be more efficient and quick than the implementation of the more conventional Reed-Solomon based
RAID-6. In the next section we will demonstrate the advantage of ZN -RAID using an example of Linux
kernel implementation of Z17-RAID system.
4. Linux Kernel ZN -RAID Implementation
4.1. Syndrome Calculation for the Reed-Solomon RAID-6. First, let us briefly recall the RAID-6
scheme based on Reed-Solomon code in the Galois field F˜, see [1] for more details. Let D0, . . . , DN−1 be the
bytes of data from N information disks. Then the parity bytes P and Q are computed as follows, using 4
g = {02} ∈ F˜:
(13) P = D0 +D1 + . . .+DN−1, Q = D0 + gD1 + . . .+ g
N−1DN−1.
The multiplication by g = {02} can be viewed as the following matrix multiplication.
(14)


y0
y1
y2
y3
y4
y5
y6
y7


=


0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1
0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0




x0
x1
x2
x3
x4
x5
x6
x7


=


x7
x0
x1 ⊕ x7
x2 ⊕ x7
x3 ⊕ x7
x4
x5
x6


Given (14), parity equations (13) become similar to (10). Indeed, the element g generates a cyclic group,
so a 2-error correcting Reed-Solomon code is a partial case of a cone based RAID. However, ZN -RAID has
several advantages. For instance, using Sylvester matrices one can achieve a simpler implementation of
matrix multiplication.
4 Algebraically, we use the standard representation in electronics: F˜ = GF (2)[x]/I where the ideal I is generated by
x8 + x4 + x3 + x2 + 1 and g = x+ I
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4.2. Linux Kernel Implementation of Syndrome Calculation. To compute the Q-parity, we rewrite
(13) as
(15) Q = D0 + g(D1 + g(. . .+ g(DN−2 + gDN−1) . . .)))
which requires (N − 1) multiplications by g = {02}.
The product y of a single byte x and g = {02} can be implemented as follows.
uint8 t x, y; y = (x << 1) ˆ ((x & 0x80) ? 0x1d : 0x00);
Notice that (x & 0x80) picks out x7 from x, so
((x & 0x80) ? 0x1d : 0x00)
selects between the two bit patterns 00011101 and 00000000 depending on x7. Since the carry is discarded
from (x << 1),
(16) (x << 1) = [x6, x5, x4, x3, x2, x1, x0, 0]((x & 0x80) ? 0x1d : 0x00) = [0, 0, 0, x7, x7, x7, 0, x7].
We can also implement the multiplication as follows.
int8 t x, y; y = (x + x) ˆ (((x < 0) ? 0xff : 0x00) & 0x1d);
Here we treat the values as signed, rather than unsigned. Whilst this implementation appears more
complex than the first (since it uses addition and comparison), it can efficiently be implemented using
SIMD instructions on modern processors, such as MMX/SSE/SSE2/AltiVec.
In particular, we will use the following four SSE2 instructions, which store the result in place of the second
operand:
pxor x, y : y = x ˆ y; pand x, y : y = x & y;
paddb x, y : y = x + y; pcmpgtb x, y : y = (y > x) ? 0xff : 0x00;
Therefore we can implement a single multiplication with the following pseudo SSE2 assembler code. We
assume that the variables y and c are initialised as y = 0 and c = 0x1d.
pcmpgtb x, y : y = (x < 0) ? 0xff : 0x00; // (x < 0) ? 0xff : 0x00
paddb x, x : x = x + x; // x + x
pand c, y : y = y & 0x1d; // ((x < 0) ? 0xff : 0x00) & 0x1d
pxor x, y : y = x ˆ y; // (x + x) ˆ
// (((x < 0) ? 0xff : 0x00) & 0x1d)
The comparison operation overwrites the constant 0 stored in y. Therefore, when we implement the
complete algorithm we must recreate the constant before each multiplication. We can do it as follows.
pxor y, y : y = y ˆ y; // y ˆ y = 0
Besides the five instruction above we need three other instructions to complete the inner loop of the
algorithm. They are multiply, fetch a new byte of data D and update the parity variables P and Q:
(17) P = D + P, Q = D + gQ.
The complete algorithm requires the following eight instructions.
pxor y, y : y = y ˆ y; // y ˆ y = 0
pcmpgtb q, y : y = (q < 0) ? 0xff : 0x00; // (q < 0) ? 0xff : 0x00
paddb q, q : q = q + q; // q + q
pand c, y : y = y & 0x1d; // ((q < 0) ? 0xff : 0x00) & 0x1d
pxor y, q : q = q ˆ y; // g.q = (q + q) ˆ
// (((q < 0) ? 0xff : 0x00) & 0x1d)
movdqa d[i], d : d = d[i] // d[i]
pxor d, q : q = d ˆ q; // d[i] ˆ p
pxor d, p : p = d ˆ p; // d[i] ˆ g.q
We can gain a further increase in speed by partially unrolling the ’for’ loop around the inner loop.
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4.3. Reconstruction. We consider a situation that two data disks Dx and Dy have failed. We must
reconstruct Dx and Dy from the remaining data disks Di (i 6= x, y) and the parity disks P and Q, see (13).
Let us define Pxy and Qxy as the syndromes under an assumption that the failed disks were zero:
(18) Pxy =
∑
i6=x,y
Di, Qxy =
∑
i6=x,y
giDi.
Rewriting (13) in the light of (18),
(19) Dx +Dy = P + Pxy, g
xDx + g
yDy = Q+Qxy.
Let us define
(20) A = (1 + gy−x)−1, B = g−x(1 + gy−x)−1.
Now we eliminate Dx from equations (19):
(21) Dy = (1 + g
y−x)−1(P + Pxy) + g
−x(1 + gy−x)−1(Q+Qxy) = A(P + Pxy) +B(Q +Qxy).
Finally, Dx is computed from Dy by the back substitution into (19):
(22) Dx = Dy + (P + Pxy).
4.4. Linux Kernel Implementation of Reconstruction. We compute the following values in F˜:
(23)
A = (1 + gy−x)−1, B = g−x(1 + gy−x)−1 = (gx + gy)−1,
Dy = A(P + Pxy) +B(Q +Qxy), Dx = Dy + (P + Pxy).
It is worth pointing out that for specific x and y, we only need to compute A and B once. The Linux kernel
provides the following look-up tables:
raid6 gfmul[256][256] : xy raid6 gfexp[256] : gx
raid6 gfinv[256] : x−1 raid6 gfexi[256] : (1 + gx)−1
Using this, we compute A and B as follows:
A = raid6 gfexi[y-x] and B = raid6 gfinv[raid6 gfexp[x] ˆ raid6 gfexp[y]]
To reconstruct Dx and Dy we start by constructing Pxy and Qxy using the standard syndrome code. Then
we execute the following code.
dP = P ˆ Pxy; // P + Pxy
dQ = Q ˆ Qxy; // Q +Qxy
Dy = raid6 gfmul[A][dP] ˆ raid6 gfmul[B][dQ]; // A(P + Pxy) +B(Q +Qxy)
Dx = Dy ˆ dP; // Dy + (P + Pxy)
4.5. Z17-RAID Implementation. The multiplication by the Sylvester matrix g looks like
(24)


y0
y1
y2
y3
y4
y5
y6
y7
y8
y9
y10
y11
y12
y13
y14
y15


=


0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1




x0
x1
x2
x3
x4
x5
x6
x7
x8
x9
x10
x11
x12
x13
x14
x15


=


x15
x0 ⊕ x15
x1 ⊕ x15
x2 ⊕ x15
x3 ⊕ x15
x4 ⊕ x15
x5 ⊕ x15
x6 ⊕ x15
x7 ⊕ x15
x8 ⊕ x15
x9 ⊕ x15
x10 ⊕ x15
x11 ⊕ x15
x12 ⊕ x15
x13 ⊕ x15
x14 ⊕ x15


.
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We implement the multiplication of a double byte y = gx as follows:
int16 t x, y; y = (x + x) ˆ ((x < 0) ? 0xffff : 0x0000);
We can implement this in assembler using the following seven instructions.
pxor y, y : y = y ˆ y; // y ˆ y = 0
pcmpgtw q, y : y = (q < 0) ? 0xffff : 0x0000; // (q < 0) ? 0xffff : 0x0000
paddw q, q : q = q + q; // q + q
pxor y, q : q = q ˆ y; // g.q = (q + q) ˆ
// ((q < 0) ? 0xffff : 0x0000)
movdqa d[i], d : d = d[i] // d[i]
pxor d, q : q = d ˆ q; // d[i] ˆ p
pxor d, p : p = d ˆ p; // d[i] ˆ g.q
Below are the results of the Linux kernel RAID-6 algorithm selection programs, aimed to select the fastest
implementation of the algorithm. Algorithms using CPU/MMX/SSE/SSE2 instructions with various levels
of unrolling are compared. The results were obtained from a 2.8 GHz Intel Pentium 4 (x86).
DP-RAID Z17-RAID
int32x1 694 MB/s 766 MB/s
int32x2 939 MB/s 854 MB/s
int32x4 635 MB/s 838 MB/s
int32x8 505 MB/s 604 MB/s
mmxx1 1893 MB/s 2117 MB/s
mmxx2 2025 MB/s 2301 MB/s
sse1x1 1200 MB/s 1284 MB/s
sse1x2 2000 MB/s 2263 MB/s
sse2x1 1850 MB/s 2357 MB/s
sse2x2 2702 MB/s 3160 MB/s
Comparing the above results against the standard Linux kernel results shows an average of 14.5% speed
increase and an increase of 16.9% for the fastest sse2x2 implementation. This is consistent with the
theoretical increase of 14.3% for seven instructions instead of eight instructions. It is worth mentioning
that no look-up tables have been used to implement Z17-RAID.
4.6. ZN RAID Reconstruction. We need to compute the following matrices and vectors:
(25)
A = (1 + gy−x)−1, B = g−x(1 + gy−x)−1 = (gx + gy)−1
Dy = A(P + Pxy) +B(Q +Qxy), Dx = Dy + (P + Pxy).
We rewrite them as follows:
(26)
z = y − x, ∆P = P + Pxy, ∆Q = Q+Qxy
Dy = (1 + g
z)−1∆P +g−x(1 + gz)−1∆Q, Dx = Dy +∆P.
Using the standard identities g−k = g17−k and (1 + g)−1 = 1 + g2 + . . .+ g16, we derive new identities:
(27)
(1 + gz)−1 = 1 + g2z + g4z + . . .+ g16z,
g−x(1 + gz)−1 = g17−x(1 + gz)−1 = g17−x(1 + g2z + g4z + . . .+ g16z).
Consequently, we need to compute
(28)
(1 + gz)−1∆P = (1 + g2z + g4z + . . .+ g16z)∆P =
= 1 + g2z(1 + g2z(1 + g2z(1 + g2z(1 + g2z(1 + g2z(1 + g2z(1 + g2z∆P )))))))
and
(29)
g−x(1 + gz)−1∆Q = g17−x(1 + g2z + g4z + . . .+ g16z)∆Q =
= g17−x(1 + g2z(1 + g2z(1 + g2z(1 + g2z(1+g2z(1 + g2z(1 + g2z(1 + g2z∆Q))))))))
Both (28) and (29) require only one principle operation, multiplication by gk.
The multiplication of a single word y = gkx for 1 ≤ k ≤ 16 can be implemented as follows.
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int16 t x, y;
y = (x << k) ˆ (x >> (17 - k)) ˆ (((x << (k - 1)) < 0) ? 0xffff : 0x0000);
We precompute m = k− 1 and n = 17− k as they remain constant during reconstruction. This leads to the
following assembler implementation.
pxor y, y : y = 0 movdqa x, z : z = x
psllw m, z : z = x << (k-1)
pcmpgtw z, y : y = (((x << (k-1)) < 0) ? 0xffff : 0x0000
paddw z, z : z = x << k
pxor z, y : y = (((x << (k-1)) < 0) ? 0xffff : 0x0000) ˆ (x << k)
psrlw n, x : x = x >> (17-k) pxor x, y : y = g ˆ k x
Below is a table showing benchmark results of complete reconstruction algorithm implemented using SSE2
assembler and the standard Linux kernel look-up table reconstruction implementation, for the cases of
double data disk failure, double disk failure of one data disk and the P-parity disk, and double parity disk
failure. Note the data represents time taken to complete benchmark, so lower is better.
Failure DD DP PQ
DP-RAID 2917 2771 905
Z17-RAID 2711 1274 809
Comparing the complete reconstruction algorithm implemented using SSE2 assembler against the standard
Linux kernel look-up table implementation, shows approximately 7% speed increase for DD failure, 54%
speed increase for DP failure and 11% speed increase for PQ failure.
5. Conclusions.
In this paper we have demonstrated that cones provide a natural framework for the design of RAID. They
provide a flexible approach that can be used to design a system. It is worth further theoretical investigation
what other examples of cones can be constructed or what the maximal possible size of a cone is.
We have also demonstrated that cyclic groups give rise to natural and convenient to operate examples of
cones. One particular advantage is that ZN -RAID does not require support of the Galois field operations.
On the practical side, Z17-RAID and Z257-RAID are breakthrough techniques that show at least 10%
improvement during simulations compared to DP-RAID.
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